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Partisan Gerrymanders:
Upholding Voter Suppression and
Choosing Judicial Abdication in Rucho v.
Common Cause
FRANCES R. HILL*
Under the Constitution, voters choose their elected officials. Partisan gerrymanders, however, enable elected officials to choose their voters and, in the process, dilute the
votes of citizens who do not support them. From this perspective, partisan gerrymanders undermine the sovereignty
of the people and, thereby, undermine the foundation of this
democratic republic. In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Supreme Court declared that partisan gerrymandering raises
a nonjusticiable political question beyond the competence of
the federal courts. This Article asks: How did this happen?
How could the Supreme Court abdicate its duty to protect
the sovereignty of the people and its duty to provide access
to justice? The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice
John Roberts, located the issues raised in these cases not in
the jurisprudence of voting and voting rights but in a series
of narrow claims about the competence of federal courts to
craft appropriate legal standards. The dissent, penned by
Justice Elena Kagan, focused on voters, voting, and the sovereignty of the people. Grounded in the constitutional values
of a democratic republic, the dissent offered a passionate repudiation of virtually every element of the majority opinion.
*

Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar for the Profession at
the University of Miami School of Law. She earned her Ph.D. at Harvard University in comparative politics and political theory and her J.D. at the Yale Law
School. She has written broadly on elections and on campaign finance and testified as an expert witness several times before congressional committee hearings
on these topics. She teaches courses in tax, business, and constitutional law.
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Yet, in the end, it was the dissent that developed a methodology, based on the work of the lower federal courts, for a
workable standard for addressing the challenges that the
majority rejected as impossible. It was the dissent that found
a way forward based on the recognition of the modern technology of vote dilution that provides the basis for preserving
the voters’ access to justice. Nevertheless, the crafty and at
times disingenuous framework of the majority opinion that
ignored voting rights and democracy prevailed. This Article
suggests that this may well be only a temporary victory as a
younger generation of lawyers, judges, and citizens with
more experience with the technology of partisan gerrymandering will find the majority’s framework and strategy as
implausible and unpersuasive as the dissent already did in
Rucho.
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INTRODUCTION
In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Supreme Court held that partisan gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable political question and remanded the two cases before the Court to the appropriate United
States district courts “with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.”1 The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice John Roberts, located the issues raised by partisan gerrymanders not in the
jurisprudence of voting and voting rights but in a series of narrow
claims relating to what he portrayed as the inability of the federal
courts to craft appropriate legal standards and remedies.2
The dissent, written by Justice Elena Kagan, focused on voters,
voting, and the sovereignty of the people.3 It is grounded in constitutional values and the values of a democratic republic.4 It is a passionate repudiation of virtually every element of the majority’s opinion.5 It excoriated the majority for what the dissent concluded was
the majority’s failure to fulfill the duty of the federal courts to uphold the concept that in the United States the people are sovereign.6
The majority found the issue of partisan gerrymandering technically beyond the capacity of the courts to craft legal standards, but
it did not find that partisan gerrymandering posed any difficulty to
the operation of the constitutional system.7 The majority noted that
1

Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019).
Id. at 2491, 2494 (“The question here is whether there is an ‘appropriate
role for the Federal Judiciary’ in remedying the problem of partisan gerrymandering—whether such claims are claims of legal right, resolvable according to legal
principles, or political questions that must find their resolution elsewhere.”). The
Chief Justice was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh.
3
Id. at 2511–13 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
4
Id. at 2512–15.
5
See id. at 2509–25.
6
See id. at 2511, 2525.
7
See id. at 2500, 2507 (majority opinion).
2
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partisan gerrymanders had been controversial from the beginning of
the republic.8 It concluded that the United States could continue to
live with partisan gerrymandering.9
The dissent focused on what it regarded as the existential threat
that partisan gerrymandering posed to the sovereignty of the people.10 It dismissed the majority’s complacency based on historical
experience by analyzing the changes in partisan gerrymanders over
time and concluded that partisan gerrymanders both diluted the vote
of individuals and undermined the constitutional structure based on
the sovereignty of the people.11 It pointed out to the majority that
“[t]hese are not your grandfather’s—let alone the Framers’—gerrymanders.”12 These were instead stratagems for enduring entrenchment of a particular political party in power.13 In sum, the dissent
found that partisan gerrymanders, which were always a problem,
had become so dangerous that the Supreme Court had a duty to craft
a remedy.14 The dissent pointed out that the majority’s abdication of
its constitutional duty was not only wrong, but it was also unnecessary.15 Accusing the majority of failing to understand the opinions
of the lower courts, the dissent claimed that the lower courts had
already offered a methodology allowing courts to decide cases involving partisan gerrymanders.16
Each of these opinions is complex and consequential. The majority opinion is a carefully crafted enigma that can only be described as radical. But its radicalism was carefully concealed in what
8

Id. at 2494–96.
See id. at 2508; id. at 2512 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s idea
instead seems to be that if we have lived with partisan gerrymanders so long, we
will survive.”).
10
See id. at 2513 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“And gerrymanders will only get
worse . . . . And someplace along this road, ‘we the people’ become sovereign no
longer.”).
11
See id. at 2512–13.
12
Id. at 2513.
13
See id. at 2512–13.
14
See id. at 2513, 2515.
15
See id. at 2516 (“But in throwing up its hands, the majority misses something under its nose: What it says can’t be done has been done.”).
16
Id. (“Over the past several years, federal courts across the country—including, but not exclusively, in the decisions below—have largely converged on a
standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims (striking down both
Democratic and Republican districting plans in the process).”).
9
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it presented as technical issues relating to the definition of standards
and the application of appropriate legal tests.17 It ended with an offramp for the federal courts and an unpersuasive denial that this judicial abdication left the people of the United States no access to
justice relating to the vote dilution on which partisan gerrymanders
are built.18 The majority reached this radical conclusion by discussing partisan gerrymanders without locating that discussion within
election jurisprudence, without acknowledging the harm that partisan gerrymanders inflict on individual voters, who are only allowed
to cast a diluted vote, without acknowledging the harm to democracy itself and with only occasionally referencing the constitutionality of certain partisan gerrymanders.19
Efforts in the majority opinion to reconcile the reasoning with
the result required a careful analysis of not only what was written
but how it was written, as well as a careful consideration of what
was not written. Silence played a significant role in the majority
opinion. This is well-concealed radicalism undermining the very
foundation of the Constitution—the principle that the people choose
their government and the principle that government is accountable
to the people.
The dissent offered a reminder of the role of voters and voting
as the source of sovereignty under the Constitution.20 Silence played
no role in the dissenting opinion. The dissent documented the harms
inflicted on individual citizens and on the democratic system
through partisan gerrymandering.21 Without honest elections, the
foundational premise of the Constitution has no operational meaning. Without access to federal courts, voting rights cannot be protected and voter suppression cannot be combatted. Treating the
question of partisan gerrymandering as nonjusticiable imposes
17

See id. at 2500, 2507 (majority opinion).
See id. at 2506–08.
19
See id. at 2495, 2499. These references were cryptic and were based only
on one case not directly involved with elections and voting. See id. at 2499. Nevertheless, references to the constitutionality of partisan gerrymanders is like a land
mine hidden in the language of the majority opinion in case it might be useful in
a future case seeking to strip partisan gerrymanders from the constitutional protection afforded them by the court’s holding that partisan gerrymandering cases
are not justiciable.
20
See id. at 2511–12 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
21
See id. at 2512.
18
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lasting harm without meaningful remedies on both individual voters
and the democratic system. At the same time, so the majority seemed
to claim, it will protect the Court from undue entanglement in contested and divisive issues.22 In short, the Court cast its vote for voter
suppression without appearing to do so.
How did this happen? It happened because there was a majority
on the Court that supported an opinion that was carefully and cleverly designed to produce the result that partisan gerrymanders are
not justiciable.23 In other words, there was a majority on the Court
for this form of voter suppression. Why this was so is itself an intriguing question, but it is not the question addressed in this Article.
Here, the focus is on how the majority crafted its opinion without
acknowledging what it was doing.
Judicial opinions are not simply a discussion of the law as applied to the facts of a case. Opinions are constructed.24 They reflect
both tactical and strategic considerations.25 In other words, judicial
opinions reflect a conscious, intentional framework identifying the
issues the opinion will and will not discuss, the facts that it will and
will not acknowledge, the precedents it will rely on and past cases
that it will not mention. Judicial opinions end in a manner consistent
with how they begin.26 Frameworks usually include what may be
called a game plan dealing with how the elements of the framework
will be presented, what will be the tone of the opinion, and what
kind of language will be used to present essential claims.27 Judicial
22

Id. at 2495–97 (majority opinion) (distinguishing Court’s role in one-person, one-vote and racial gerrymandering from its role in general partisan gerrymandering).
23
See id. at 2507–08.
24
See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric:
Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1386 (1995).
25
See id. at 1394 (discussing complex choices judges must make when articulating legal principals, choosing between “tests couched in general or even abstract terms—mansions of many rooms in which implementing judges move
about freely—and tests using very specific words that cabin judges’ discretion
tightly.”).
26
See id. at 1386–88.
27
See id. at 1405 (“The basic analytical structure that judges use to decide
such cases—be it risk assessment, utilitarian weighing of costs, or political philosophy—not only determines the results but displays the judge’s own inner
thought processes. The rhetoric will generally follow that of the analytical mode
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opinions do not explicitly articulate the framework or the game
plan.28 Sometimes these frameworks, along with the embedded
game plans, are obvious, and sometimes they are not.29 Sometimes
it is possible to understand the reasoning in an opinion without focusing directly on the framework and the game plan. Rucho is not
one of those cases.
The majority decision achieved its remarkable and alarming outcome by simply refusing to treat partisan gerrymanders as a form of
voter suppression or, indeed, as an activity that is related to voting
at all. Partisan gerrymanders were treated as a hyper-technical issue
of defining a standard of partisanship.30 Defining the issue as one of
procedural fairness and claiming that the federal courts are not
equipped to deal with such an issue allowed the majority to claim
that the Court was committed to good government at the very time
it was casting its lot with voter suppression that undermined democracy.31 In a strategic commitment to silence, the majority acknowledged no harm arising from partisan gerrymanders.32 Silence was so
important to the majority opinion that only rarely and briefly did the
Court refer to judicial restraint,33 lest it become apparent that any
benefit to the Court came at a very high cost to voters and to democracy. Silence and avoidance were so important to the majority that
it treated the significant constitutional issues in this case as matters
of technical detail that could and should be subdivided into slices
and snippets of issues that could be separated or reaggregated as
necessary to suit the majority’s purposes.34 This remarkable position
could not have been unconsidered. No one would have written an
opinion dealing with partisan gerrymandering without considering
chosen, and the adoption of a particular way of analyzing the problem may be as
important to the judge as the instant result.”).
28
See id. at 1405 (“Their rhetoric will sound very neutral and principle oriented, as if the results in this or any one case were secondary. The authors, however, are quite aware that they are determining or influencing the outcome of many
cases, defining a field of law and the considerations or values that will predominate.”).
29
See id.
30
See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2499–500, 2507 (2019).
31
See id.; id. at 2512 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
32
See id. at 2506 (majority opinion); but see id. at 2516 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
33
See id. at 2506–07 (majority opinion).
34
See id.
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the role of voting in the legitimacy of the Constitutional system, and
no one would have been so unmindful of the harm arising from this
omission, unless they specifically intended to do this.
The dissent also had a framework and a game plan. Nothing
about the dissent was hidden or indirect. Silence played no role. Big
constitutional issues like the sovereignty of the people and accountability to the people were not disaggregated but remained to be considered in their fulsome import for democracy and for the rights of
voters.35 The dissent identified the issue as voter suppression.36 The
dissent identified the harms inflicted on individual voters and on democracy.37 The dissent found the relevant facts in the record compiled by the lower courts as triers of fact and found the relevant law
in the Constitution and its history.38 To the dissent, the core issue
was to avoid voter suppression through vote dilution and to maintain
the ability of the people to exercise their constitutional role as the
sovereign that chooses the people who will govern them—at least
until the next election.39 To the dissent, voters’ assurance that they
will be able to cast an undiluted vote in the next election is their
expression of sovereignty and their means of holding their representatives accountable.40 To the dissent, this is the core idea of democracy.41 As such, the dissent identified the harms arising from
partisan gerrymanders that permit politicians to entrench themselves
as rulers over voters who do not wish to be ruled by them. Partisan
gerrymanders matter because they violate the right of individual voters and undermine democracy as a system of government.42 Like the
majority opinion, the dissent illustrates how outcomes are shaped by
the analytical framework, by the questions acknowledged, and by
the questions neither asked nor acknowledged.43
These themes, and the frameworks and game plans written by
the majority and the dissent, are considered in four parts, each of
35

See id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2513 (“Partisan gerrymandering operates through vote dilution—
the devaluation of one citizen’s vote as compared to others.”).
37
See id. at 2514–15.
38
See id. at 2509–12.
39
See id. at 2511–13.
40
See id. at 2512–14.
41
See id. at 2512.
42
Id. at 2513.
43
See id. at 2516–23.
36
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which compares and contrasts the approaches of the majority and
the dissent. Part I asks where each of the opinions begin and what
questions each opinion sets out to address. What values are referenced in each opinion? Why do partisan gerrymanders matter? Under what circumstances do they matter? What role should the judicial branch of the federal government play? In short, what is a partisan gerrymandering case about and why do partisan gerrymandering cases matter, if at all?
Part II locates these issues and values in the broader fields of
election law and constitutional law. It poses the question of whether
partisan gerrymanders are technical puzzles or choices of values. It
then considers how the answers to this question shape the analysis
of the facts in the cases before the Court in Rucho. This Part suggests
that partisan gerrymanders cannot be separated from the rights and
duties of voters and that voting is both an individual right and a constitutional duty to “ordain and establish this Constitution.”44 If “We
the People”45 are sovereign, voting is our means of expressing and
exercising that sovereignty. The harms addressed and the constitutional predicates available to redress these harms turn on vote dilution, which is to say disenfranchisement of voters of the “other” political party.
Part III considers how the majority and the dissent view the reasoning of the lower federal courts in the two cases before the Court.
The majority concluded that partisan gerrymanders raise political
questions that make cases arising from partisan gerrymanders nonjusticiable. The dissent concluded that the very standard that the majority claimed could not be developed by a federal court had already
been developed by the lower courts.
Part IV considers how Rucho ends, if, indeed, it does end. Does
the majority see its opinion as a means of weaponizing the political
question doctrine in the service of voter suppression? Did the majority understand what the lower courts had achieved in shaping a
path forward in partisan gerrymandering cases, or did the majority
deliberately ignore the path forward laid out in the lower court opinions because it was intent on permitting partisan gerrymanders as
disguised instruments of voter suppression? Did the majority see its
opinion as protection for the Court, justified even at the cost of
44
45

U.S. CONST. pmbl.
Id.
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abdicating its duty to do justice in cases dealing with an issue as
foundational as voting and the sovereignty of the people? Did the
majority actively suppress voters and voting, or did it abandon voters to the predations and ambitions of the political branches? What
does Rucho mean for democracy?
I.

DISTINCTIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR DIVERGENT OUTCOMES
The majority opinion is an enigma. Indeed, it is a radical enigma
that denies the targets of partisan gerrymandering access to justice.
However, it is never quite clear why the legal reasoning leads to this
conclusion. Every element of the framework is so veiled that it is
difficult to state with any certainty what the majority thinks the issue
is and what the precedents are. At every turn, what the majority does
not say raises questions about what it does say, yet these questions
are never addressed. The game plan in the majority opinion deployed an impressively broad array of the skills of a renowned advocate who insisted on at least trying to control the discussion, limit
the applicable precedents, and so describe either the precedents or
the facts that they become scarcely recognizable. It is possible that
the majority hoped to write a quiet opinion that simply rid the federal
courts of what the majority may have regarded as annoying cases.
But that was not to be.
The dissent was a passionate refutation of every aspect of the
majority opinion—its identification of the issue, its mode of reasoning, and certainly, its holding. The dissent developed an entirely distinct framework and argued it out loud and without strategic or tactical silence. Grounded in constitutional values, the dissent argued
for the rights of the people of the United States and the protection of
the political system of the United States.46 It argued that federal
courts should do their jobs and demonstrated that the lower courts
had been doing this throughout the history of the cases before the
Court in Rucho.47 Like the majority, the dissent fully understood that
where it began would be foundational in determining where it
ended.

46
47

See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2524–25 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2516.
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Beginning with the Court: A Framework for Judicial
Abdication
The majority opinion by Chief Justice Roberts treated a neutral
standard as an end in itself. From the beginning of its opinion, the
majority stated that the cases before it “require us to consider once
again whether claims of excessive partisanship in districting are
‘justiciable’—that is, properly suited for resolution by the federal
courts.”48 The majority stated that “[t]he districting plans at issue
here are highly partisan, by any measure. The question is whether
the courts below appropriately exercised judicial power when they
found them unconstitutional as well.”49 These concerns with the role
of the federal courts took center stage in the majority opinion.50 Voters were not on stage at all and voting as a constitutional process
was nowhere to be found. Instead, the majority opinion focused on
Article III and the role of the federal courts, stating that Article III
“limits federal courts to deciding ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’”51
Chief Justice Roberts then stated that “[w]e have understood that
limitation to mean that federal courts can address only questions
‘historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial
process.’”52 He then presented a series of cursory references to the
political question doctrine53 and concluded by framing the question
in this case in the following terms: “The question here is whether
there is an ‘appropriate role for the Federal Judiciary’ in remedying
the problem of partisan gerrymandering—whether such claims are
claims of legal right, resolvable according to legal principles, or political questions that must find their resolution elsewhere.”54
It may seem that the majority began in a strange place—somewhere in the middle of the discussion of something that is not quite
the heart of what is at issue here. The majority opinion admitted that
partisan gerrymanders are a problem but not such a significant problem that the Court must attempt to find a way to address them.55 It
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id. at 2491 (majority opinion).
Id.
See id. at 2496.
Id. at 2493.
Id. at 2493–94 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)).
See id. at 2494.
Id. at 2494 (citing Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1926–37 (2018)).
See id. at 2494, 2501.
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never acknowledged harms to voters or to the United States political
system. This, as becomes abundantly clear, precluded discussion of
the issue that would have made the majority’s holding seem even
more inexplicable. What was the majority doing? Was it limiting
access to justice in voting rights matters? Was it protecting the federal courts from the intense controversies swirling around voting
and elections? Was it tipping the balance in favor of some political
interest? It is impossible to say with any certainty, and that appears
to have been by design.
B.

Beginning with the Voters: A Framework for Protecting
Democracy
The dissent began with democracy and the Constitution and
never wavered in putting both at the core of the opinion.56 In the
dissent, Rucho is about vote dilution and voter suppression, and it is
about a Constitution based on the sovereignty of the people.57 Most
of all, the dissent is about the sovereignty of the people depending
on the ability of the people to vote without having their votes diluted
and their right to vote suppressed by officeholders seeking to entrench themselves in power.58 It condemned the majority opinion as
“tragically wrong” because it misconstrued the Constitution and the
role of the people under the Constitution.59
Justice Kagan’s beginning could not be further from Chief Justice Roberts’ beginning and it could not have been closer to the Constitution and the issues raised in this case. She began:
For the first time ever, this Court refuses to remedy a constitutional violation because it thinks the
task beyond judicial capabilities.
And not just any constitutional violation. The
partisan gerrymanders in these cases deprived citizens of the most fundamental of their constitutional
rights: the rights to participate equally in the political
process, to join with others to advance political
56
57
58
59

See id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2511–13.
See id. at 2512.
Id. at 2509.
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beliefs, and to choose their political representatives.
In so doing, the partisan gerrymanders here debased
and dishonored our democracy, turning upside-down
the core American idea that all governmental power
derives from the people. These gerrymanders enabled politicians to entrench themselves in office as
against voters’ preferences. They promoted partisanship above respect for the popular will. They encouraged a politics of polarization and dysfunction. If left
unchecked, gerrymanders like the ones here may irreparably damage our system of government.60
The difference between this starting point and Chief Justice Roberts’
starting point could not be more pronounced. Justice Kagan began
with the Constitution, constitutional rights, and constitutional
harms.61 She wonders whether “[m]aybe the majority errs in these
cases because it pays so little attention to the constitutional harms at
their core.”62 She noted that the majority “dutifully recit[es]” the
facts in the two cases here but then “leaves them forever behind,
instead immersing itself in everything that could conceivably go
amiss if courts became involved.”63
In the face of this approach by the majority, the dissent chose to
focus on the facts, “[t]o recount exactly what politicians in North
Carolina and Maryland did to entrench their parties in political office, whatever the electorate might think” and then “to elaborate on
the constitutional injury those politicians wreaked, to our democratic system and to individuals’ rights.”64 Recounting the facts and
considering the harms arising from the partisan gerrymanders was
of critical importance to Justice Kagan because it “will help in considering whether courts confronting partisan gerrymandering claims
are really so hamstrung—so unable to carry out their constitutional
duties—as the majority thinks.”65 She then urged the readers of her

60
61
62
63
64
65

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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presentation of the facts and the harms they caused to “ask yourself:
Is this how American democracy is supposed to work?”66
Justice Kagan then presented a saga of what intentional partisan
gerrymanders accomplished through experts using the latest technology to draw electoral maps.67 She shows that gerrymanders reflect the ambitions and values of the party in power and that, in each
state, mapmakers accomplished the partisan goals they were paid to
produce.68 She found that “Maryland’s Democrats proved no less
successful than North Carolina’s Republicans in devising a voterproof map.”69 She also shows that the officeholders in charge of
these efforts spoke openly about their purposes and made these purposes abundantly clear to the mapmakers selected for this important
role.70 The results produced numerous potential maps, including at
least one map in each case that served the purposes that the mapmaker was hired to produce.71 Experience showed that the mapmakers were skillful and fulfilled their contractual obligations.72 The
new district, or districts, produced reliable partisan results that entrenched the paying party in a position of power over the will of the
people who were assigned, through packing or cracking, to have
their votes diluted and, thus, their right to vote suppressed.73 Justice
Kagan described this as a “grisly tale” of partisan entrenchment.74
Justice Kagan then asked again: “Is that how American democracy
is supposed to work?”75 She answered her own question by observing, “I have yet to meet the person who thinks so.”76 She is equally
clear and direct in articulating the reason that no one thinks so, stating: “If there is a single idea that made our Nation (and that our Nation commended to the world), it is this one: The people are sovereign.”77 Sovereignty of the people means that the people choose
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Id.
Id. at 2509–11.
See id. at 2510–11.
Id. at 2511.
See id. at 2510–11.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 2510–14.
Id. at 2510.
Id. at 2511.
Id.
Id.
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their representatives; this requires voting and care in preserving voting rights.78 The dissent stated clearly that,
Free and fair and periodic elections are the key to that
vision. The people get to choose their representatives. And then they get to decide, at regular intervals, whether to keep them . . . . Election day—next
year, and two years later, and two years after that—
is what links the people to their representatives, and
gives the people their sovereign power. That day is
the foundation of democratic governance.79
In the next sentence, the dissent concluded, “partisan gerrymandering can make it meaningless.”80
II.

PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING IN CONSTITUTIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
The majority expressed no particular concern, much less alarm,
over vote dilution and voter suppression resulting from partisan gerrymandering. It focused on the harm that courts would experience if
they heard these cases.81 It did not focus on the harm to the people
and to democracy from partisan gerrymandering, and it only
acknowledged these harms in passing at the end of its opinion.82 The
dissent linked the selective dilution of some votes in order to entrench politicians of a different political party in power to fundamental attacks on the Constitution and on the principle of the sovereignty of the people.83 The majority asked how this might affect
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See id.
Id. at 2511–12. Kagan bolsters her statement by citing to James Madison
for the proposition that “republican liberty” requires “not only, that all power
should be derived from the people; but, that those entrusted with it should be kept
in dependence on the people.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 4 (James Madison) (J.
& A. McLean eds., 1788).
80
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2512 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
81
See id. at 2499–500, 2503–05 (majority opinion).
82
See id. at 2506.
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See id. at 2512–13 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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courts.84 The dissent addressed how this does in fact affect American democracy.85
A.

The Majority Refuses to Acknowledge Harms to
Democracy
The majority asserted that “[p]artisan gerrymandering is nothing
new.”86 Although true, it is far from clear what argument the majority was attempting to make. The majority recounted gerrymandering
controversies even during the debates over ratification of the Constitution, but concluded that “[a]t no point was there a suggestion
that the federal courts had a role to play”87 and then added that “[n]or
was there any indication that the Framers had ever heard of courts
doing such a thing.”88 While the majority made no argument based
on this history, it did state that “[e]arly on, doubts were raised about
the competence of the federal courts to resolve those questions.”89
This is a robust assertion of the meaning of the silence relating to
courts that the majority had found in the ratification debates.
At this point, recognition of Baker v. Carr90 became unavoidable. Nothing in Chief Justice Roberts’ brief acknowledgment of
Baker as a “leading case” indicated its significance in challenging
voter suppression and vote dilution.91 Nothing in the majority opinion acknowledged the new era of voting rights litigation that followed the Court’s decision in Baker.92 He noted that the district
court had held that the case was not justiciable, based on Colegrove
v. Green and other Supreme Court precedents, but that “[t]his Court
reversed.”93 He instead emphasized the Court’s review of the
84

See id. at 2499–500, 2503–05 (majority opinion).
See id. at 2512 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
86
Id. at 2494 (majority opinion).
87
Id. at 2496.
88
Id.
89
Id. The Court then cited two of the last of the Jim Crow cases through
which the federal courts upheld the suppression of black voters in blatant disregard of the 15th Amendment. Id. (first citing Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932);
and then citing Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946)) (both cases holding that
gerrymanders were not justiciable).
90
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
91
See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2496.
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See id.
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Id. (referencing Colegrove, 328 U.S. 549).
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political question doctrine, “including whether there is ‘a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.’”94
The Chief Justice then summarized the Court’s decision, stating
that, “[t]he Court concluded that the claim of population inequality
among districts did not fall into that category, because such a claim
could be decided under basic equal protection principles.”95 From
this, one might assume that Baker was a relatively predictable or
insignificant case, rather than the beginning of a new jurisprudence
taking account of the valence of each vote. The majority refused to
acknowledge that the world of elections and voting had changed or
started to change and that Baker and its numerous consequential
progeny reframed vote dilution and voter suppression.96 The only
other reference, albeit oblique and indirect, to this line of cases was
a subsequent assertion that this line of cases does not apply in any
way to partisan gerrymander cases.97
The Chief Justice then embraced the concept of a “constitutional
political” gerrymander.98 The majority opinion neither addressed
what a “political gerrymander” might be nor discussed how it might
relate to a partisan gerrymander. But the reference to a “political
gerrymander” moved the discussion away from the powerful reasoning and holdings of Baker and its progeny—grounded in the
rights of voters and the constitutional structure based on the sovereignty of the people—to a far more circumscribed discussion of
grounds for determining that an issue raises a political question that
cannot be decided by the federal courts.99 Moving the analysis away
from voting was essential to Chief Justice Roberts’ determination
that partisan gerrymanders are political questions and, as such, may
94

Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
Id. (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 226).
96
In 1964, the Supreme Court issued two landmark decisions that extended
the reasoning of Baker v. Carr to Congressional districts and to both houses of a
bicameral state legislature. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8, 18 (1964) (requiring “one person, one vote” apportionment based on population in congressional districts in Georgia); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558, 568–570, 586–
87 (1964) (requiring that both houses of Alabama state legislature be apportioned
on the basis of population consistent with the principle of “one person, one vote”).
97
See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497 (referencing numerous “one-person, onevote” cases without expressly referencing Baker).
98
Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999)).
99
See id.
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not be challenged by voters in federal courts.100 Vote dilution and
voter suppression may thus continue undisturbed. The shift in the
terms of the discussion from “partisan” to “political” consideration
allowed Chief Justice Roberts to claim a principled position, although one that required a contrived argument that the Framers approved of this position.101 The Chief Justice claimed that:
To hold that legislators cannot take partisan interests
into account when drawing district lines would essentially countermand the Framers’ decision to entrust districting to political entities. The “central
problem” is not determining whether a jurisdiction
has engaged in partisan gerrymandering. It is “determining when political gerrymandering has gone too
far.”102
At this point, the Chief Justice abandoned any references to
Baker to instead offer a review of the partisan gerrymandering cases
focused solely on a judicially discoverable and manageable standard
for determining whether there has been an impermissible partisan
gerrymander, rather than the unexplained category of a “constitutional political gerrymander” within the meaning of Hunt v.
Cromartie.103
The Chief Justice took a position similar to that of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Vieth v. Jubelier, where Justice Kennedy
stated that an appropriate standard must have a “limited and precise
rationale” and be “clear, manageable, and politically neutral.”104 He
found support for this approach in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence
in Davis v. Bandemer.105
Chief Justice Roberts then claimed that “[p]artisan gerrymandering claims invariably sound in a desire for proportional

100
101
102
103
104

See id.
See id.
Id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296 (2004)).
See id. at 2497–98.
See id. at 2498 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306–08 (Kennedy, J., concur-

ring)).
105

See id. (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O’Connor,
J., concurring)).
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representation.”106 He emphasized that the Court had never found
that the Constitution required proportional representation.107 As a
result, the Chief Justice claimed that plaintiffs phrase their claims in
other terms, usually implicating fairness.108 His rejection of fairness
as a relevant or even reasonable value in the discussion of partisan
gerrymandering became the centerpiece of his rejection and even
ridicule of the idea that partisan gerrymanders imposed harms on
voters and on the constitutional system.109 He explained his approach in the following terms:
Unable to claim that the Constitution requires proportional representation outright, plaintiffs inevitably ask the courts to make their own political judgment about how much representation particular political parties deserve—based on the votes of their
supporters—and to rearrange the challenged districts
to achieve that end. But federal courts are not
equipped to apportion political power as a matter of
fairness, nor is there any basis for concluding that
they were authorized to do so.110
Quoting Justice Scalia in Vieth, Chief Justice Roberts found that
“‘[f]airness’ does not seem to us a judicially manageable standard.”111 He then argued that there is no “‘clear, manageable and politically neutral’ test for fairness.”112 The first problem identified by
the majority was that “it is not even clear what fairness looks like in
this context.”113 The next sentence observes that “[t]here is a large
measure of ‘unfairness’ in any winner-take-all system.”114 Chief
Justice Roberts speculated that “[f]airness may mean a greater number of competitive districts” but then observed that undoing the
106

Id. at 2499.
See id.
108
Id.
109
See id. at 2499–502.
110
Id. at 2499.
111
Id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 291 (2004)).
112
Id. at 2500. The internal quotation is in the original but there is no citation.
It seems to be a reference to the language of Justice Kennedy in Vieth, which
appears in Rucho as something of mantra. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307–08.
113
Id.
114
Id.
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previous cracking and packing in the interest of more competitive
districts “could be a recipe for disaster for the disadvantaged
party.”115 A second alternative, according to the Chief Justice, might
require more cracking and packing reflecting the “gravitational pull
of proportionality” so that each party has “its ‘appropriate’ share of
‘safe’ seats.”116 However, this approach, the majority asserted,
would undermine making districts more competitive.117 A third possibility is to measure fairness “by adherence to ‘traditional’ districting criteria, such as maintaining political subdivisions, keeping
communities of interest together, and protecting incumbents.”118
But this approach would not serve the goal of neutrality. At this
point, the Chief Justice declared defeat and concluded that:
Deciding among just these different versions of fairness (you can imagine many others) poses basic
questions that are political, not legal. There are no
legal standards discernible in the Constitution for
making such judgments, let alone limited and precise
standards that are clear, manageable, and politically
neutral. Any judicial decision on what is “fair” in this
context would be an “unmoored determination” of
the sort characteristic of a political question beyond
the competence of the federal courts.119
The majority claimed the determination that fairness cannot be
given operational meaning in the context of defining electoral districts means that the “determinative question” relating to partisan
gerrymanders—”How much is too much?”—cannot be answered.120
The majority asked: “At what point does permissible partisanship
become unconstitutional?”121 This is a rhetorical question, followed
115

Id.
Id. (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 130–31 (1986)).
117
Id.
118
Id. (citations omitted).
119
Id. (citing Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)).
120
Id. at 2501.
121
Id. This question would have greater force if the opinion did not interchange the idea of permissible partisanship for the idea of a constitutional partisan
gerrymander, which are two quite distinct things. They may become the same
thing if every district reflects an intentional partisan gerrymander and the concept
116
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by several others, that the Chief Justice made no attempt to consider.122 He concluded where he intended to conclude and again
drew his reasoning and his language from Vieth, stating:
Even assuming the court knew which version of fairness to be looking for, there are no discernible and
manageable standards for deciding whether there has
been a violation. The questions are “unguided and ill
suited to the development of judicial standards,” and
“results from one gerrymandering case to the next
would likely be disparate and inconsistent.”123
At the end of the section of the opinion dealing with what the
majority considered the applicable precedents, it raised the issue it
attributes to the appellees in this case, who “contend that if we can
adjudicate one-person, one-vote claims, we can also assess partisan
gerrymandering claims.”124 The majority struggled to address a
question premised on the existence of a larger voting rights jurisprudence that is relevant to partisan gerrymandering cases. The first
sentence of the response was short but revealing, asserting that “the
one-person, one-vote rule is relatively easy to administer as a matter
of math.”125 The next sentence marked a denial of the relevance of
voters in partisan gerrymander cases, which the majority now
treated as solely about political parties.126 The majority took the position that partisan gerrymander cases are not easy to administer “because the Constitution supplies no objective measure for assessing
whether a districting map treats a political party fairly.”127 The majority did not even acknowledge its pivot from voters to political
parties or why such a distinction might be appropriate or what relationships between voters and political parties might be relevant. Instead, the majority simply asserted, without explanation, that “[i]t
of a constitutional partisan gerrymander is given operational constitutional meaning.
122
Id.
123
Id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296 (2004)); Vieth, 541 U.S.
at 308 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
See id.
127
Id.
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hardly follows from the principle that each person must have an
equal say in the election of representatives that a person is entitled
to have his political party achieve representation in some way commensurate to its share of statewide support.”128 The majority then
extended this reasoning to vote dilution claims in the following
terms:
More fundamentally, “vote dilution” in the one-person, one-vote cases refers to the idea that each vote
must carry equal weight. In other words, each representative must be accountable to (approximately) the
same number of constituents. That requirement does
not extend to political parties. It does not mean that
each party must be influential in proportion to its
number of supporters.”129
This pivot from accountability to influence and from individual voters to political parties captures the reasoning of the majority opinion.
Why the majority found that this particular pivot required no supporting reasoning is itself unexplained by the remainder of the opinion. One might reasonably think that a partisan gerrymandering case
is itself about the mechanisms of accountability available to voters
in particular districts in the face of extreme partisanship. That, after
all, was the claim in this case. However, that was not the position
taken in the reasoning in the majority opinion. Here, Chief Justice
Roberts characterized partisan gerrymandering claims as guaranteeing a certain level of representation to political parties.130
The majority opinion also rejected the idea that the cases involving racial gerrymanders “provide an appropriate standard for assessing partisan gerrymandering.”131 The majority drew the following distinction: “Unlike partisan gerrymandering claims, a racial
gerrymandering claim does not ask for a fair share of political power
128

Id.
Id.
130
See id. at 2501–02 n.1 (referring to an assertion in the dissent “that the
Framers viewed political parties ‘with deep suspicion’” and then managing to turn
this observation into the insinuation that the dissent used this observation to support “a constitutional theory that guarantees a certain degree of representation to
political parties.”); see infra notes 106–17 and accompanying text.
131
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2502.
129
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and influence, with all the justiciability conundrums that entails. It
asks instead for the elimination of a racial classification. A partisan
gerrymandering claim cannot ask for the elimination of partisanship.”132
Justice is not possible because the need for precise metrics has
proved, in the majority’s view, too difficult to satisfy with sufficient
precision.133 Reaching this decision was made possible by the careful avoidance of considerations of justice and the role of voting in
achieving it. The majority opinion was designed to avoid what the
dissent treated as foundational values by treating them as less constitutionally significant than the complexities of implementation.
This asserted problem was exacerbated by the barely articulated
premise that partisan gerrymanders require that only one standard
be applied,134 ignoring the possibility that the empirical diversity of
partisan gerrymanders might be addressed by a range of standards
based on a constitutionally permissible methodology. In other
words, the majority treated partisan gerrymanders as a doctrinal issue rather than as an empirical issue. This may well have been part
of the game plan—a deliberate insistence on an unachievable uniformity that impedes the identification and understanding of partisan gerrymanders. Because the majority refused to acknowledge the
individual and systemic harms arising from partisan gerrymanders,
it did not acknowledge that its understanding was attenuated. How
it could have maintained that view after reading the opinions of the
courts below, as well as at least certain amicus briefs, suggests that
the majority was not clear about what it thought was at stake and for
whom.
B.
The Dissent Affirms the Sovereignty of the People
The dissent reminded the majority what is at stake in this case—
the viability of democracy based on the sovereignty of the people,
who exercise their sovereignty through voting and the right of individuals to vote.135 Both are necessary. Yet, noted the dissent, neither
was addressed by the majority.136 It reminded the majority, which
132
133
134
135
136

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2509, 2511–12.
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quoted the language of Vieth repeatedly, that Justice Kennedy had
observed that partisan gerrymanders can lead to “rigg[ed] elections.”137 The dissent also reminded the majority that “this Court has
recognized” that the “‘core principle of republican government’ . . . is ‘that the voters should choose their representatives, not
the other way around.’”138 The dissent concluded: “Partisan gerrymandering turns it the other way around. By that mechanism, politicians can cherry-pick voters to ensure their reelection. And the
power becomes, as Madison put it, ‘in the Government over the people.’”139
The dissent emphasized that “[t]he majority disputes none of
this.”140 The dissent found this statement worth repeating, possibly
hoping that doing so would allow the majority to understand the implications of its agreement: “I think it important to underscore that
fact: The majority disputes none of what I have said (or will say)
about how gerrymanders undermine democracy. Indeed, the majority concedes (really, how could it not?) that gerrymandering is ‘incompatible with democratic principles.’”141 At this point the dissent
asked: “And therefore what?”142 and noted that “[t]hat recognition
would seem to demand a response.”143 The dissent identified two
ideas put forward by the majority. One idea is to leave the entire
matter to the political branches, and the other is that political gerrymanders are as old as the Constitution.144 Justice Kagan found the
suggestion that the issue of gerrymanders should be left to the political branches “so dubious on its face” that a response could be postponed until the end of the dissent.145 The idea that the long history
of partisan gerrymanders justifies complacency about them was rejected by the dissent as “ha[ving] no cause.”146
137

Id. at 2512 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
138
Id. (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n,
576 U.S. 787, 824 (2015)).
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Id. (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794)).
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Id.
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Id. (quoting id. at 2506 (majority opinion)).
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Pointing to technological advances and reliance on big data, the
dissent looked at the methodology used by the lower courts and
warned that “gerrymanders will only get worse (or depending on
your perspective, better) as time goes on—as data becomes ever
more fine-grained and data analysis techniques continue to improve.”147 Because the framework of the dissent was grounded in
constitutional values regarding voting and the sovereignty of the
people of the United States, the dissent reminded everyone, including the members of the majority, that “someplace along this road,
‘we the people’ become sovereign no longer.”148
It is the ability to acknowledge the harms arising from partisan
gerrymanders that distinguishes the two opinions. The majority tried
to normalize partisan gerrymanders while claiming that they could
not be addressed through judicial remedies.149 The dissent identified
and analyzed the harms and found ways to achieve what the majority
found to be impossible.150 It is the framework based on constitutional principles that permitted the dissent to identify and address
harms in the interest of democratic governance and the sovereignty
of the people. The dissent provided a trenchant summary of its position, stating: “Partisan gerrymandering of the kind before us not
only subverts democracy (as if that weren’t bad enough). It violates
individuals’ constitutional rights as well.”151 The dissent did not
claim to have special insight in stating the effect on individual voters, but instead it found that “[t]his Court has recognized extreme
partisan gerrymandering as such a violation for many years.”152 This
practice operates through vote dilution, which the dissent explained
as “the devaluation of one citizen’s vote as compared to others.”153
According to the dissent, vote dilution implicates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—which the dissent stated
“we long ago recognized, ‘guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election’ of legislators.”154 The dissent
amplified its reliance on what have become known as the one147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Id. at 2513.
Id.
See id. at 2494, 2502 (majority opinion).
See generally id. at 2509–25 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2513.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2514 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964)).
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person, one-vote cases, observing that the opportunity for equal participation “can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight
of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the
free exercise of the franchise.”155
The dissent noted that partisan gerrymandering also implicates
the First Amendment by inflicting both personal and associational
harm.156 The dissent found that “[b]y diluting the votes of certain
citizens, the State frustrates their efforts to translate those affiliations
into political effectiveness.”157
The dissent then reminded the majority that “[t]hough different
Justices have described the constitutional harm in diverse ways,
nearly all have agreed on this much: Extreme partisan gerrymandering (as happened in North Carolina and Maryland) violates the Constitution.”158 Indeed, the dissent again noted that “the majority never
disagrees; it appears to accept the ‘principle that each person must
have an equal say in the election of representatives.’”159 Looking
forward to the majority’s discussion of standards applicable to partisan gerrymanders, the dissent observed that, “without this settled
and shared understanding that cases like these inflict constitutional
injury, the question of whether there are judicially manageable
standards for resolving them would never come up.”160 In sum, the
dissent indicated the majority declares defeat prematurely, before it
had allowed itself to understand both the issue and the possibility of
a reasonable response.
III.
“FAIRNESS” IN DISTRICTING: DEBATING JUDICIAL
CAPABILITIES AND THE LOWER COURTS’ DECISIONS
Because the majority and dissent asked different questions at the
beginning of their opinions, they focused on very different questions
relating to the efforts made to draw congressional district boundaries
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Id. (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555).
See id.
Id.
Id. at 2514–15.
Id. at 2515 (quoting id. at 2501 (majority opinion)).
Id.
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in North Carolina and Maryland.161 Thus, the majority and the dissent came to different conclusions about the opinions of the threejudge district courts in each case.
A.

The Majority Holds That the Cases Are Not Justiciable
The majority begins with a complete rejection of a role for a federal court in the matters before it in this case, stating:
Appellees and the dissent propose a number of
“tests” for evaluating partisan gerrymandering
claims, but none meets the need for a limited and precise standard that is judicially discernible and manageable. And none provides a solid grounding for
judges to take the extraordinary step of reallocating
power and influence between political parties.162
This introduction to the assessment of the holdings and decisions in
opinions by the lower federal courts in the North Carolina and Maryland cases are consistent with the majority’s resolution to focus on
the courts and not on the voters in this case. The majority uses this
perspective to highlight the inadequacies of the standards and tests
used by these courts with respect to each of the claims made in these
cases.
1. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM
IN THE NORTH CAROLINA CASE
The majority began with the test developed by the district court
in North Carolina to evaluate the claim based on the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.163 The district court developed a three-part test that required the plaintiffs to establish the
state’s “predominant purpose” to dilute the vote of the Democratic
Party voters164 and to establish that such vote dilution is “likely to
persist” in subsequent elections.165 The defendants must also prove
161

Compare id. at 2494 (majority opinion), with id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
162
Id. at 2502 (majority opinion).
163
See id. at 2492–93.
164
Id. at 2502 (citing Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d. 777, 865
(M.D.N.C. 2018)).
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Id. (citing Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 867).
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that the discriminatory effects are “attributable to a legitimate state
interest or other neutral explanation.”166 The majority dismissed
each of the elements of this test briskly with cryptic conclusory pronouncements.167 With respect to the first element, the majority asserted without further explanation that “determining that lines were
drawn on the basis of partisanship does not indicate that the districting was improper.”168 Perhaps by way of explanation, the majority
then asserts that “[a] permissible intent—securing partisan advantage—does not become constitutionally impermissible, like racial discrimination, when the permissible intent ‘predominates.’”169
This approach raises obvious questions that are not addressed. What
makes seeking partisan advantage in this particular way constitutionally permissible? The issue here is not just one of a constitutionally permissible intent—partisan advantage—but that inflicting the
harm on targeted voters and on democracy itself goes far beyond
some unspecified partisan intent. This rephrasing of a question without appearing to have done so is part of the game plan that the majority devised. A political party that sends a solicitation for funds
does not inflict harm on other voters in the same way that it does
when it implements a partisan gerrymander to suppress voting. What
other kinds of voter suppression activities would the majority be
willing to claim might be consistent with the Constitution? It mentions nothing else in this opinion. Would any redistricting effort stop
a modest or limited partisan advantage if it has the political authority
and the political power to define a partisan advantage that would
elect members of a particular political party? How persuasive is the
majority’s earlier suggestion that partisan gerrymandering does not
violate the Constitution?170
The second factor, the likelihood of persistent dilution of the
votes of voters from the non-favored party—the party that did not
draw the district boundaries at issue—is dismissed as “prognostications as to the outcome of future elections.”171 The majority is
166
167
168
169
170
171

Id. (citing Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 868).
See id. at 2502–04.
Id. at 2502–03.
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certainly correct that voters can change their preferences and their
votes in future elections, but it is noteworthy that the examples given
refer to examples not related to the redistricting plans at issue in this
case.172 Even here, however, the main problem is that the Court is
concerned more with the possible burden on the judges hearing these
cases rather than on the voters supporting candidates in whose favor
they can cast only diluted votes.173 After a rather scattershot parade
of imponderables, the majority concludes that “asking judges to predict how a particular districting map will perform in future elections
risks basing constitutional holdings on unstable ground outside judicial expertise.”174 The majority never considers the possibility that
what seems such a daunting task might well be made manageable
by adequate fact-finding based on contemporary comparables in the
hands of the district courts in these cases.
The majority summarily rejects the usefulness of the third
prong—the defendants’ showing of a legitimate reason for the discriminatory effects—stating that it “just restates the question.”175
The majority never seemed to consider that this question was intended as the basis of a balancing test that applied to the relative
harms affecting certain voters and that, in these circumstances, it
would aid in understanding the context of the factors at issue.
2. THE FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS IN BOTH CASES
These cases also involved a three-part test related to the First
Amendment that the majority rejected. The test is based on “proof
of intent to burden individuals based on their voting history or party
Judges must forecast with unspecified certainty whether a prospective winner will have a margin of victory sufficient to permit him to ignore the supporters of his defeated opponent (whoever that may turn out to be). Judges not only have to pick the
winner—they have to beat the point spread.
Id.
172
Id. at 2503–04. Remarking with respect to the redistricting efforts at issue
in Bandemer and Vieth: “In our two leading partisan gerrymandering cases themselves, the predictions of durability proved to be dramatically wrong.” Id. at 2503.
Whatever else one can conclude with respect to these two examples, it is certainly
true that they occurred before the technological and data innovations that characterize current gerrymandering efforts.
173
See id. at 2502–04.
174
Id. at 2503–04.
175
Id. at 2504.
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affiliation; an actual burden on political speech or associational
rights; and a causal link between the invidious intent and actual burden.”176
The majority began its critique of this test with an assertion that
form controls substance and that form alone is sufficient.177 In its
critique, the majority opinion stated that “there are no restrictions on
speech, association, or any other First Amendment activities in the
districting plans at issue. The plaintiffs are free to engage in those
activities no matter what the effect of a plan may be on their district.”178 There is no such provision in the plan because a successful
gerrymander makes it unnecessary. If a gerrymander is done successfully, it can suppress the voters and dilute votes without leaving
fingerprints, apart from the boundaries, which define the voters included or excluded, or in gerrymandering language, “packing and
cracking.”179 Nevertheless, the majority concluded complacently
that “[t]he First Amendment test simply describes the act of districting for partisan advantage. It provides no standard for determining
when partisan activity goes too far.”180
The majority was similarly dismissive of the second prong of the
First Amendment test, which involved the “actual burden” on voters.181 The majority concluded that “the slight anecdotal evidence
found sufficient by the district courts in these cases shows that this
too is not a serious standard for separating constitutional from unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.”182
As for the third prong of the test, the causal link between the
intent to burden particular voters and an actual burden found, the
majority focused primarily on its critique of anecdotal evidence and
examples, suggesting that this causal link requires very little evidence of an actual burden.183 In an indirect reference to the causal
link, the majority again invoked the idea of a “constitutional partisan
gerrymander”184 as a phantom it has summoned from an apparently
176
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178
179
180
181
182
183
184

Id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 2513–14 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2504 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2504–05.
See id. at 2504.
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limitless reservoir of concepts that themselves have no grounding in
the Constitution or election law statutes or regulations. The majority
is simply attempting to create a phrase that it may hope it can transform into a constitutional principle. In other words, the majority is
simply making this up and telling us to believe it and act accordingly. It is at times like this that the majority should remember that
“the people” of the United States are sovereign and no institution of
government is the source of sovereign authority. This is a remarkable enterprise in a case that claims it is acting in the interest of judicial restraint.
3. THE DISSENT’S TEST
The majority had little to say with respect to the dissent’s test,
and most of what it does say is dismissive.185 It begins with the idea
that the criteria must be the same for all states during all time periods.186 This sudden appearance of uniformity is something of a surprise, a tardily summoned rabbit emerging briefly from a handy hat.
This is bolstered, if that is the word, by the observation that “[t]he
degree of partisan advantage that the Constitution tolerates should
not turn on criteria offered by the gerrymanderers themselves.”187
Why not? Who would be a better source of insight into the intentions
and expertise involved?
The majority also claimed that the dissent’s test has no response
to the question of how much is too much.188 However, the majority
certainly does not refer to the entire response of the dissent, although
it does seem to have time and space for a bit of gloating over what
it interprets as the dissenters’ pique over what it sees as an unsatisfactory response.189 But, at this point the majority seems to have depleted its reserve of equanimity and has no substantive insights of
its own to offer. The majority responded to the dissent’s answer—
“[t]his much is too much”190—by complaining “[t]hat is not even
trying to articulate a standard or rule.”191
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

See id. at 2505–06.
Id. at 2505.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing id. at 2521 (Kagan, J., dissenting)).
Id.
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While the majority agreed with the dissent’s observation that
matters of degree are left to the courts in other instances, it responded by trying to distinguish partisan gerrymandering from these
other instances, stating: “[j]udges began with a significant body of
law about what constituted a legal violation . . . . Here, on the other
hand, the Constitution provides no basis whatever to guide the exercise of judicial discretion.”192 The sleight of hand here again illuminates the majority’s insistence that, in the case of partisan gerrymanders, the guidance must come from the Constitution,193 and that the
guidance from the election law cases arising from Baker, which
freed districting law from the political question doctrine, was not
relevant. This, too, illustrates another strategy in the game plan. As
it does throughout the opinion, the majority designs a series of narrowly crafted boxes and then insists that no guidance from one small
box has any relevance to the contents of any of the other small
boxes. An opinion without reference to values is perfectly positioned to deny that there is no relevant guidance.
The majority concludes its brief comments on the dissent’s test
by pointing out that the only reference in the Constitution “that specifically addresses the matter assigns it to the political branches.”194
It is entirely unclear what the majority is doing here. The language
in Article I, Section 4, Clause l of the Constitution deals with elections for members of the House of Representatives and refers only
to “Times, Places and Manner.”195 These issues are referred to the
state legislatures, although Congress may intervene as it sees fit.196
What is not made clear, although every member of the majority undoubtedly has a very clear understanding of this, is that areas of responsibility are not assigned to the judicial branch in the same way
they are assigned to the legislative branch.197 Courts do not define
their own agendas based on similar express allocations of authority.
Instead, courts hear cases within their jurisdiction as defined in
192

Id. at 2506.
See id.
194
Id.
195
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
196
See Id.
197
Article I “enumerates” the powers of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Article II references three tasks of the Executive Branch as well as mentioning certain other duties and responsibilities. See U.S. CONST. art. II.
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applicable federal law, including federal statutes.198 Such definitions
of judicial jurisdiction are not limited to the terms of the Constitution because Congress has the power to statutorily create judicial
jurisdiction through the “Laws of the United States” and the Court’s
precedents further define judicial jurisdiction.199 Yet, in this case,
the majority was not interested in expanding the applicable precedents to include cases on voting rights or the conduct of elections.200
4. VIOLATION OF THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE AND ELECTION BY
THE PEOPLE IN THE NORTH CAROLINA CASE
The North Carolina district court held that “the Elections Clause
did not empower State legislatures to disfavor the interests of supporters of a particular candidate or party in drawing congressional
districts.”201 It also held that “partisan gerrymandering infringes the
right of ‘the People’ to select their representatives.”202 The majority
then asserted that this holding by the district court was inconsistent
with the language in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Vieth.203 At this point it would be useful to consider that a plurality
opinion, like that in Vieth,204 is not necessarily binding precedent,
and it, thus, arguably does not bind the North Carolina district
court.205 The majority seems somewhat miffed that, in its words,
“[t]he District Court nevertheless asserted that partisan gerrymanders violate ‘the core principle of [our] republican government’ preserved in Art. I, § 2, ‘namely, that the voters should choose their
198

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
See id.; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
200
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508.
201
Id. at 2506 (quoting Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 937
(M.D.N.C. 2018)).
202
Id. (citing Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 938).
203
See id.
204
See id. at 2498. See generally Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 285–86
(2004) (plurality opinion).
205
See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys
the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgements on the narrowest
grounds . . . .’”(quoting Greg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))).
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representatives, not the other way around.’”206 The majority’s game
plan of subdividing precedents and concepts into slivers of reasoning confined to narrow boxes offers no possible response to this kind
of reasoning.
The Chief Justice responded by identifying another small box
defined by the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4.207 This
stratagem is perfectly consistent with the core purpose of the majority opinion because “[the] Court has several times concluded . . . that the Guarantee Clause does not provide the basis for
a justiciable claim.”208 The majority offers no further insight into
why the Guarantee Clause might be a more suitable and appropriate
claim than the language in Article I.209
B.

The Dissent Offers a Test Based on the Lower Courts’
Opinions
The dissent seems perplexed by the majority opinion. In an extended section dealing with the lower courts’ development of tests
of partisan gerrymanders and the dissent’s development of how to
apply the lower courts’ approaches more broadly, the dissent begins
by remarking:
So the only way to understand the majority’s opinion
is as follows: In the face of grievous harm to democratic governance and flagrant infringements on individuals’ rights—in the face of escalating partisan
manipulation whose compatibility with this Nation’s
values and law no one defends—the majority declines to provide any remedy. For the first time in this
Nation’s history, the majority declares that it can do
nothing about an acknowledged constitutional violation because it has searched high and low and cannot
find a workable legal standard to apply.210
The dissent highlights the two problems identified by the majority.
“First and foremost” is the lack of a neutral baseline from which to
206
207
208
209
210

Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (citing Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 940)).
See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (citing Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 940)).
See id.
Id. at 2515 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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measure injury.211 Because the plaintiffs want some form of proportional representation, which is not required under the Constitution,
the federal courts are left in the position of having to define political
fairness.212 The second and “determinative” question is “[h]ow
much is too much?” gerrymandering.213 Claiming that “no ‘discernible and manageable’ standard is available,” the majority expresses
a concern that “courts could willy-nilly become embroiled in fixing
every districting plan.”214
The dissent agreed that “[r]espect for state legislative processes—and restraint in the exercise of judicial authority—counsels
intervention in only egregious cases.”215 But the dissent insisted that
the majority’s declaration of the impossibility of a constructive role
for the judiciary was ill-advised and premature.216 It concluded that,
in throwing up its hands, the majority misses something under its nose: What it says can’t be done has
been done. Over the past several years, federal courts
across the country—including, but not exclusively,
in the decisions below—have largely converged on a
standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering
claims (striking down both Democratic and Republican districting plans in the process) . . . . The standard does not use any judge-made conception of electoral fairness—either proportional representation or
any other; instead, it takes as its baseline a State’s
own criteria of fairness, apart from partisan gain. And
by requiring plaintiffs to make difficult showings relating to both purpose and effects, the standard invalidates the most extreme, but only the most extreme,
partisan gerrymanders.217
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See id. at 2499–500 (majority opinion).
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Id. at 2515 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 2516.
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See id.
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The dissent stated that the majority’s critiques of the lower courts’
approaches revealed “a saddening nonchalance about the threat such
districting poses to self-governance.”218 The dissent rejected the majority’s view that “judicial policing in this area cannot be either neutral or restrained” and concluded that “[t]he lower courts’ reasoning . . . proves the opposite.”219
1. A STANDARD CRAFTED BY THE LOWER COURTS
The dissent began by suggesting, indirectly but forcefully, that
the majority could not see or understand the standard developed by
the lower courts because it chose not to see it.220 It claimed that the
majority disregarded the common features of the lower courts’ test
because it “disaggregates the opinions below, distinguishing the one
from the other and then chopping up each into ‘a number of
“tests.”’”221 The dissent accused the majority of deliberately misreading the lower court cases and deliberately misinterpreting these
approaches to develop a common standard.222
The dissent explained that both of the lower courts focused on
“the harm of vote dilution,” which the North Carolina court analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Maryland court analyzed under the First Amendment.223 The dissent then asserted that
the lower courts used “basically the same three-part test” based on
intent, effects, and causation to determine whether plaintiffs had
made out a vote dilution claim.224 This vote dilution claim required
showing that state officials’ “predominant purpose” was to “‘entrench [their party] in power’ by diluting the votes of citizens favoring its rival.”225 In addition, the plaintiffs must establish that the gerrymandering efforts have diluted their votes “‘substantially.’”226 If
the plaintiffs make these showings of “predominant purpose” and
218

Id.
Id.
220
See id. at 2515–16.
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Id. at 2516.
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Id.
224
Id.
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Id. (quoting Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 864
(M.D.N.C. 2018) (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 791 (2015))).
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Id. (quoting Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 498 (D. Md. 2018)).
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“substantial[]” vote dilution, then the State must offer a “legitimate,
non-partisan justification to save its map.”227
The dissent then concluded that the test developed by the lower
courts looks “utterly ordinary,” at least to lawyers, and that “[i]t is
the sort of thing courts work with every day.”228 Justice Kagan challenged the idea that the task at hand exceeded the judicial competence of the federal courts and thus rejected the majority’s holding
that partisan gerrymandering cases are nonjusticiable.229
The dissent offered both a detailed analysis of the application of
this standard to North Carolina and Maryland and challenged the
critique of these cases by the majority. In both cases, state officials
openly declared partisan purposes for the maps that were drawn at
their direction and under their supervision.230 To the dissent, these
unabashed public statements satisfied the “predominant purpose”
prong of the test of a partisan gerrymander.231 It then stated that it
found the majority’s remarks about the purpose analysis “discomforting.”232 It was not a disagreement over the lower courts’ findings
but an assertion that “state officials’ intent to entrench their party in
power is perfectly ‘permissible,’ even when it is the predominant
factor in drawing district lines.”233 The dissent stated bluntly and
unequivocally: “But that is wrong.”234 The dissent explained that it
may be true in some instances, such as “when state officials used
political data to ensure rough proportional representation between
the two parties,”235 and “true enough that even the naked purpose to
gain partisan advantage may not rise to the level of constitutional
notice when it is not the driving force in mapmaking or when the

227

Id. (citing Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 867). “Neither North Carolina nor
Maryland offered much of an alternative explanation for the evidence that the
plaintiffs put forward. Presumably, both States had trouble coming up with something. Like the majority . . . I therefore pass quickly over this part of the test.” Id.
at 2516 n.2.
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Id. at 2516–17.
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Id. at 2519–20.
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Id. at 2517.
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Id. (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 738 (1973)).
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intended gain is slight.”236 The dissent distinguished these two situations from the situation in the court below, explaining, “[b]ut when
political actors have a specific and predominant intent to entrench
themselves in power by manipulating district lines, that goes too
far.”237 The dissent then addressed the cases before the Court directly: “But why even bother with hypotheticals? Just consider the
purposes here. It cannot be permissible and thus irrelevant, as the
majority claims, that state officials have as their purpose the kind of
grotesquely gerrymandered map that, according to all this Court has
ever said, violates the Constitution.”238
The dissent then addressed the consequences of the activity, focusing in particular on whether it substantially diluted the plaintiffs’
votes.239 The dissent noted that the majority had not focused on the
“evidence the District Courts relied on” and then noted that the evidence, particularly from North Carolina, “is the key to understanding both the problem these cases present and the solution to it they
offer.”240 The dissent explained the importance of this evidence as
follows: “The evidence reveals just how bad the two gerrymanders
were (in case you had any doubts). And it shows how the same technologies and data that today facilitate extreme partisan gerrymanders also enable courts to discover them, by exposing just how much
they dilute votes.”241 The approach, labelled the “extreme outlier approach,” used advanced computer technology “to randomly generate a large collection of districting plans” that reflected a state’s geographical and political geography and meet its declared districting
criteria, except for partisan gain.242 The computer program then used
actual precinct-level votes from past elections to determine a partisan outcome.243 Justice Kagan explained how the resulting maps can
be used to find and cure partisan gerrymanders by creating a continuum of, for example, one thousand maps, ranging from maps most
236

Id. (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 285–86 (2004) (plurality opin-
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favorable to Republicans to maps most favorable to Democrats.244
This allows a court to identify the “median outcome” and compare
it to the maps at each tail of the continuum, which are maps representing partisan extremes and the most significant vote dilution.245
Using this approach showed that the North Carolina map generated
by the State “was an out-out-out-outlier.”246 The dissent concluded
that
this distribution of outcomes provides what the majority says does not exist—a neutral comparator for
the State’s own plan . . . . It essentially answers the
question: In a State with these geographic features
and this distribution of voters and this set of districting criteria—but without partisan manipulation—
what would happen?247
Maryland involved only one district requiring “only a minimal
change,” but the “Democratic officials reconfigured the entire district.”248 The Maryland district court found that “the gerrymandered
Maryland map substantially dilute[d] Republicans’ votes.”249
Noting that the majority dismissed these findings as “‘prognostications’ about the future, in which no one ‘can have any confidence,’” the dissent responded with a ringing endorsement of the
methods used by the two federal district courts and an unmistakable
repudiation of the majority’s reasoning.250 The dissent concluded:
But the courts below did not gaze into crystal balls,
as the majority tries to suggest. Their findings about
these gerrymanders’ effects on voters—both in the
past and predictably in the future—were evidencebased, data-based, statistics-based. Knowledgebased, one might say. The courts did what anyone
244
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would want a decisionmaker to do when so much
hangs in the balance. They looked hard at the facts,
and they went where the facts led them . . . . They
looked at the evidence—at the facts about how these
districts operated—and they could reach only one
conclusion. By substantially diluting the votes of citizens favoring their rivals, the politicians of one party
had succeeded in entrenching themselves in office.
They had beat democracy.251
This summation of the methodological challenges posed by the partisan gerrymander cases and the resourcefulness of the lower federal
courts in addressing these challenges also served as a harsh rebuke
of the majority opinion. There was more to come as the dissent detailed its objections to the majority’s claim that judicial oversight of
partisan gerrymandering cases would not be either “politically neutral” or “manageable.”252
The dissent was unpersuaded by and somewhat offended at what
seems to have been portrayed as a lack of effort and engagement by
the majority. The dissent found that the majority “never tries to analyze the serious question presented here—whether the kind of
standard developed below falls prey to those objections, or instead
allows for neutral and manageable oversight.”253 The dissent answered its own question with the observation that judicial oversight
“is not only possible; it’s been done.”254 It then applies this insight
to both neutrality and manageability.
2. JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY
The dissent pointed out that the district court never had to address issues of fairness because it never had to “choose among competing visions of electoral fairness.”255 The lower courts “did not try
to compare the State’s actual map to an ‘ideally fair’ one” but
“[i]nstead, they looked at the difference between what the State did
251

Id.
Id.
253
Id. at 2520. The dissent illustrated this characterization of the majority
opinion by noting: “To prove its point, the majority throws a bevy of question
marks on the page. (I count nine in just two paragraphs . . . ).” Id. at 2519–20.
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and what the State would have done if politicians hadn’t been intent
on partisan gain.”256 Rather, “the courts’ analyses used the State’s
own criteria for electoral fairness—except for naked partisan
gain.”257
In the case of North Carolina, all the maps took account of the
“State’s districting priorities” as well as its “political” and “legal
landscape.”258 The dissent explained that:
The point is that the assemblage of maps, reflecting
the characteristics and judgments of the State itself,
creates a neutral baseline from which to assess
whether partisanship has run amok. Extreme outlier
as to what? As to the other maps the State could have
produced given its unique political geography and its
chosen districting criteria. Not as to the maps a judge,
with his own view of electoral fairness, could have
dreamed up.259
The same process occurred in Maryland, where, again, the district
court “analyzed the gerrymander’s effects in much the same way—
not as against an ideal goal, but as against an ex ante baseline.”260
The dissent concluded that in the Maryland case,
[t]he court did not strike down the new Sixth District
because a judicial ideal of proportional representation commanded another Republican seat. It invalidated that district because the quest for partisan gain
made the State override its own political geography
and districting criteria. So much, then, for the impossibility of neutrality.261
As discussed above, the majority simply remarked that this
“does not make sense” because the criteria will vary over time.262
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The dissent is having none of this concern about change over time,
responding crisply:
But that is a virtue, not a vice—a feature, not a bug.
Using the criteria the State itself has chosen at the
relevant time prevents any judicial predilections
from affecting the analysis—exactly what the majority claims it wants. At the same time, using those criteria enables a court to measure just what it should:
the extent to which the pursuit of partisan advantage—by these legislators at this moment—has
distorted the State’s districting decisions.263
The dissent took this as yet another opportunity to point out that the
majority does not understand the facts or the applicable law in these
two cases.264 It pointed out that “the majority’s analysis falters because it equates the demand to eliminate partisan gerrymandering
with a demand for a single partisan distribution—the one reflecting
proportional representation.”265 The dissent concluded that those
two demands are not the same and only partisan gerrymandering is
at issue in this case.266
3. HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH?
As discussed above, the majority insisted that a court could not
determine how much partisanship is too much.267 The dissent had
little patience for this reasoning. It pointed to the two cases before
the Court and asked: “How about the following for a first-cut answer: This much is too much.”268 The majority had dismissed this
response as “not . . . serious.”269 The majority perhaps did not fully
appreciate the implications of its dismissal of the dissent’s standard
and its application as “not serious.” The dissent explained:
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Id. at 2521 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2523.
Id. at 2521.
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See id. at 2499 (majority opinion).
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By any measure, a map that produces a greater partisan skew than any of 3,000 randomly generated maps
(all with the State’s political geography and districting criteria built in) reflects “too much” partisanship . . . . The absolute worst of 3,001 possible maps.
The only one that could produce a 10–3 partisan split
even as Republicans got a bare majority of the
statewide vote. And again: How much is too much?
This much is too much . . . . A map that in 2011 was
responsible for the largest partisan swing of a congressional district in the country . . . . If the majority
had done nothing else, it could have set the line here.
How much is too much? At the least, any gerrymanders as bad as these.270
Alternatively, the dissent suggested that the majority could have focused on the “‘predominant’ purpose and ‘substantial’ effects.”271
The dissent noted: “Although purpose inquiries carry certain hazards (which courts must attend to), they are a common form of analysis in constitutional cases.”272 The dissent concluded that purpose
analysis “would be no harder here than in other contexts.”273
The dissent was similarly pointed in its dismissal of the idea that
courts cannot determine whether a particular district map “‘substantially’ dilutes the votes of a rival party’s supporters” from the baseline described by the dissent.274 As the dissent noted, courts make
such determinations “all the time.”275 The dissent observed that,
“[i]f courts are no longer competent to do so, they will have to relinquish, well, substantial portions of their docket.”276 The dissent
pointed out, in this case, “[t]hat the two courts below found constitutional violations does not mean their tests were unrigorous; it
means that the conduct they confronted was constitutionally appalling—by even the strictest measure, inordinately partisan.”277
270
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In a general condemnation of the majority’s opinion, the dissent
concluded:
The majority, in the end, fails to understand both the
plaintiffs’ claims and the decisions below. Everything in today’s opinion assumes that these cases
grew out of a “desire for proportional representation”
or, more generally phrased, a “fair share of political
power.” . . . And everything in it assumes that the
courts below had to (and did) decide what that fair
share would be. But that is not so . . . . The plaintiffs
asked only that the courts bar politicians from entrenching themselves in power by diluting the votes
of their rivals’ supporters. And the courts, using neutral and manageable—and eminently legal—standards, provided that (and only that) relief. This Court
should have cheered, not overturned, that restoration
of the people’s power to vote.278
The majority did not cheer. It accomplished, at least for a moment
or two in judicial history, what the plurality in Vieth failed to accomplish279—it achieved a 5–4 majority for treating partisan gerrymanders as nonjusticiable political questions not subject to judicial
review. The Court had been led out of the political thicket by a willful, skillful, and crafty Chief Justice. But where did Chief Justice
Roberts lead the Court and where did he leave the law?
IV.

A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT: CONSIDERING HOW
RUCHO ENDED
Rucho ended with the unobtrusively radical outcome that the beginning foreshadowed. It ended as every tragedy ends—in an inexorable place that had been the whole purpose of the enterprise.
Rucho ends by choosing to remove the Court from its constitutional
duty to ensure that the people choose their representatives and that
these representatives do not become rulers who are able to choose
their own voters. Trying to explain why the majority did this is
278
279
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beyond the scope of this Article. The reason for doing it matters less
than the fact that the majority did it. Chief Justice Roberts used his
estimable skills as an advocate to devise ways to discuss partisan
gerrymanders without discussing voters or voting, and to discuss the
dangers he might have feared would befall courts without discussing
the appropriate role of the courts. He invoked the Constitution without discussing the constitutional values at stake in this case. He managed to discuss partisan gerrymanders from a bygone era without
acknowledging the far greater precision that modern technology and
contemporary databases make possible and without ever acknowledging the constitutional harm that results from the changing circumstances. Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion about standards
unrelated to behavior or consequences and constitutional values.
Chief Justice Roberts cannot claim that he did not know what he
was doing. He clearly knew exactly what he was doing. The final
section of his opinion begins with the observation: “Excessive partisanship in districting leads to results that reasonably seem unjust.”280 This dizzying mixture of defensiveness and condescension
was followed by Chief Justice Roberts quoting Arizona State Legislature v. Independent Redistricting Commission, saying that such
gerrymandering is “incompatible with democratic principles.”281
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts then announced that this conclusion “does not mean that the solution lies with the federal judiciary.”282 What problem is he discussing? Not the voting rights of
American citizens, which remains nowhere to be found in the majority’s reasoning. Instead of the rights of voters, the majority insisted that “[f]ederal judges have no license to reallocate political
power between the two major political parties, with no plausible
grant of authority in the Constitution, and no legal standards to limit
and direct their decisions.”283 The Chief Justice then castigated the
appellees and the dissent—the appellees apparently for seeking justice and the dissent for its reading of the Constitution.284 The Chief
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Justice, who found no harm in partisan gerrymanders, catalogued
the harms arising from any view but his own in this case:
What the appellees and dissent seek is an unprecedented expansion of judicial power. We have never
struck down a partisan gerrymander as unconstitutional—despite various requests over the past 45
years. The expansion of judicial authority would not
be into just any area of controversy, but into one of
the most intensely partisan aspects of American political life. That intervention would be unlimited in
scope and duration—it would recur over and over
again around the country with each new round of districting, for state as well as federal representatives.
Consideration of the impact of today’s ruling on
democratic principles cannot ignore the effect of the
unelected and politically unaccountable branch of
the Federal Government assuming such an extraordinary and unprecedented role.285
This brief reference to the burden on the federal courts and the fleeting reference to harms arising from any attempt to address these burdens is the only rationale for this extraordinary opinion. The voters
and the role of voting remain unaddressed. Indeed, to have addressed such issues would have been to admit their importance, and
this, in turn, would have raised inconvenient questions about access
to justice.
At this point, the majority’s search for a rationale for their entire
approach gave way to a self-protective defensiveness. The majority
asserted: “Our conclusion does not condone excessive partisan gerrymandering. Nor does our conclusion condemn complaints about
districting to echo into a void.”286 What follows is a remarkable catalogue of options that have not proved successful by actors other
than the federal judiciary.287 Certain of these options depend on
strategies that the tactically narrow focus of the majority opinion had
not considered when analyzing the role of the federal courts, while
285
286
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some have been recognized as exercises in political futility from the
beginning. The majority suggested that the states should address
partisan gerrymanders through legislation, by establishing independent commissions, by appointing a state demographer, or by prohibiting actions taken for the purpose of partisan advantage.288
The majority, having failed to discuss the long line of districting
cases decided by the federal courts in response to Baker, stated approvingly that some states “have mandated at least some of the traditional districting criteria for their mapmakers,” something that the
majority found did not apply to federal action relating to partisan
gerrymanders.289 The majority pointed to actions taken by state
courts and suggested that the state courts benefit from more focused
legislation than that available to the federal courts, observing that
“[p]rovisions in state statutes and state constitutions can provide
standards and guidance for state courts to apply.”290 The majority
also noted that the Constitution gave Congress authority to amend
actions taken by states and listed several bills that have never attracted strong support in Congress.291 Indeed, the majority took the
position that “the Framers gave Congress the power to do something
about partisan gerrymandering in the Elections Clause.”292 But, the
majority never admitted that this admission strongly suggests that
the broad power of judicial review provides constitutional support
for the federal courts to play their traditional role in this area just as
they did in other voting rights matters. From this perspective, the
majority’s final defense of what it had done lacks persuasive power.
The majority insists that “[n]o one can accuse this Court of having
a crabbed view of the reach of its competence.”293 That is exactly
the point. Why did a Court that does not have a crabbed view of the
reach of its competence as a general matter write an opinion based
on a crabbed view of its competence in dealing with partisan gerrymanders? The question that remains unanswered is why the majority
insisted that it had no authority to pursue justice in a matter at the
core of the constitutional system.
288
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The dissent ended where it had begun, with its reasoning firmly
grounded in constitutional values. But the dissent proved to be decidedly more practical than the majority about locating these foundational values in contemporary controversies and devising solutions that, while far from perfect, were designed to be far better than
abdication or any other operational approach to the challenge of
high-tech, big data partisan gerrymanders.294 The dissent understood
in ways that the majority refused to admit that the elected politicians
in the executive and legislative branches would prioritize their own
careers over the future of the republic. The dissent understood that
Benjamin Franklin was speaking in practical terms when he described the new government as “a republic[,] if you can keep it.”295
The dissent also understood that “keeping” the republic would always require the active support of the judicial branch, observing
that,
This Court has long understood that it has a special
responsibility to remedy violations of constitutional
rights resulting from politicians’ districting decisions[,] . . . recognizing as we established the oneperson-one-vote rule that “our oath and our office require no less.” . . . Of course, our oath and our office
require us to vindicate all constitutional rights. But
the need for judicial review is at its most urgent in
cases like these. “For here, politicians’ incentives
conflict with voters’ interests, leaving citizens without any political remedy for their constitutional
harms.” . . . Those harms arise because politicians
want to stay in office. No one can look to them for
effective relief.296
The dissent then made short work of the various reform opportunities the majority belatedly discovered. Noting that the majority
highlighted a list of bills that had, over the years, been filed in Congress, the dissent observed that “what all these bills have in common
294
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is that they are not laws.”297 The dissent found the Chief Justice’s
comments on state courts “perplexing,” leading it to ask, “what do
those courts know that this Court does not?”298 The dissent concluded that “[w]e could have, and we should have” done what the
lower courts had already done.299 The dissent then at some length
detailed the contributions made by the lower federal courts.300 The
dissent concluded with a note of disappointment at what it regarded
as a failure by the Court, observing:
Of all times to abandon the Court’s duty to declare
the law, this was not the one. The practices challenged in these cases imperil our system of government. Part of the Court’s role in that system is to defend its foundations. None is more important than
free and fair elections.301
Then, Justice Kagan signed her opinion: “With respect but deep sadness, I dissent.”302
CONCLUSION
It is far from clear that the majority opinion can or will survive
to shape the law in this area. Its very reliance on the strategic and
tactical stratagems of its framework and its game plan are also a
source of potential vulnerability in future cases challenging the
treatment of partisan gerrymanders as political questions. As more
lawyers and judges develop greater understanding of the mechanisms of modern gerrymandering technology, the day is likely to
come—perhaps sooner rather than later—that a majority can be
found among justices who understand the technology and have the
will to address the harms of partisan gerrymandering. Until that
time, the majority opinion will deny access to justice to the individual voters who are harmed and, thereby, undermine democracy. In
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an era of politicians who accept no boundaries, courts that accept no
responsibilities are a misfortune for democracy.

